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INTRODUCTION
With the launch of the new Journal of Law and Mobility, the University
of Michigan is recognizing the transformative impact of new transportation
and mobility technologies, from cars, to trucks, to pedestrians, to drones.
The coming transition towards intelligent, automated, and connected
mobility systems will transform not only the way people and goods move
about, but also the way human safety, privacy, and security are protected,
cities are organized, machines and people are connected, and the public and
private spheres are defined.
Law will be at the center of these transformations, as it always is. There
has already been a good deal of thinking about the ways that law must adapt
to make connected and automated mobility feasible in areas like tort liability,
insurance, federal preemption, and data privacy. 1 But it is also not too early
to begin pondering the many implications for law and regulation arising from
the technology’s spillover effects as it begins to permeate society. For better
or worse, connected and automated mobility will disrupt legal practices and
concepts in a variety of ways additional to the obvious “regulation of the
car.” Policing practices and Fourth Amendment law, now so heavily centered
on routine automobile stops, will of necessity require reconsideration.
Notions of ownership of physical property (i.e., an automobile) and data (i.e.,
accident records) will be challenged by the automated sharing economy.
† Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I am
grateful for helpful comments from Ellen Partridge and Bryant Walker Smith. All errors
are my own.
1. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Kyle D. Logue & Bryce Pilz, A Survey of Legal Issues
Arising from the Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 Mich. Tel. &
Tech. L. Rev. 191 (2017).

1

2

JOURNAL OF LAW AND MOBILITY

2018

And the economic and regulatory structure of the transportation network will
have to be reconsidered as mobility transitions from a largely individualistic
model of drivers in their own cars pursuing their own ends within the
confines of general rules of the road to a model in which shared and
interconnected vehicles make collective decisions to optimize the system’s
performance. In these and many other ways, the coming mobility revolution
will challenge existing legal concepts and practices with implications far
beyond the “cool new gadget of driverless cars.”
Despite the great importance of the coming mobility revolution, the case
for a field of study in “law and mobility” is not obvious. In this inaugural
essay for the Journal of Law and Mobility, I shall endeavor briefly to make
that case.
I.

DRIVERLESS CARS AND THE LAW OF THE HORSE

A technological phenomenon can be tremendously important to society
without necessarily meriting its own field of legal study because of what
Judge Frank Easterbrook has described as “the law of the horse” problem. 2
Writing against the burgeoning field of “Internet law” in the early 1990s,
Easterbrook argued against organizing legal analysis around particular
technologies:
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to
study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with
people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse
shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on “The Law of the
Horse” is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles. 3
Prominent advocates of “Internet law” as a field rebutted Easterbrook’s
concern, arguing that focusing on cyberlaw as a field could be productive to
understanding aspects of this important human endeavor in ways that merely
studying general principles might miss. 4 Despite Easterbrook’s protestation,
a distinct field of cyberlaw has grown up in recent decades.
“The law of the horse” debate seems particularly apt to the question of law
and mobility since the automobile is the lineal successor of the horse as
society’s key transportation technology. Without attempting to offer a
general solution to the “law of the horse” question, it is worth drawing a
distinction between two different kinds of disruptive technologies—those in
which the technological change produces social changes indirectly and
2. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 207, 207-16.
3. Id.
4. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv.
L. Rev. 501 (1999).
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without significant possibilities for legal intervention, and those in which law
is central to the formation of the technology itself.
An example of the first species of technological change is air conditioning.
The rise of air conditioning in the mid-twentieth century had tremendous
effects on society, including dramatic increases in business productivity,
changes in living patterns as people shifted indoors, and the extension of
retail store hours and hence the growing commercialization of American
culture. 5 The South’s share of U.S. population was in steady decline until the
1960s when, in lockstep with the growth of air conditioning and people’s
willingness to settle in hot places, the trend abruptly reversed and the South’s
share grew dramatically. 6 The political consequences were enormous—
from Richard Nixon through George W. Bush, every elected President hailed
from warm climates.
One could say, without exaggeration, that the Willis Carrier’s frigid
contraption exerted a greater effect on American business, culture, and
politics than almost any other invention in the twentieth century. And, yet,
it would seem silly to launch a field of study in “law and air conditioning.”
Air conditioning’s social, economic, and political effects were largely
indirect—the result of human decisions in response to the new circumstances
created by the new technology rather than an immediate consequence of the
technology itself. Even if regulators had foreseen the dramatic demographic
effects of air conditioning’s spread, there is little they could have done (short
of killing or limiting the technology) to mediate the process of change by
regulating the technology.
Contrast the Internet. Like air conditioning, the Internet has had
tremendous implications for culture, business, and politics, but unlike air
conditioning, many of these effects were artifacts of design decisions
regarding the legal architecture of cyberspace. From questions of taxation of
online commercial transactions,7 to circumvention of digital rights
management technologies, 8 to personal jurisdiction over geographically
remote online interlocutors, 9 and in countless other ways, a complex of legal
and regulatory decisions created the modern Internet. From the beginning,
5. Stan Cox, Losing Our Cool: Uncomfortable Truths About Our Air-Conditioned
World (and Finding New Ways to Get Through the Summer) (2012).
6. Paul Krugman, Air Conditioning and the Rise of the South, New York Times
March 28, 2015, https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/air-conditioning-andthe-rise-of-the-south/.
7. See, e.g., John E. Sununu, The Taxation of Internet Commerce, 39 Harv. J. Leg.
325 (2002).
8. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Rif on Fair Use in the Digital Millenium Copyright
Act, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673 (2000).
9. Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal
Jurisdiction and the Internet, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1821 (2003).
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law was hovering over the face of cyberspace.
Al Gore may not have
created the Internet, but lawyers had as much to do with it as did engineers.
The Internet’s legal architecture was not established at a single point in
time, by a single set of actors, or with a single set of ideological commitments
or policy considerations. Copyright structures were born of the contestation
among one set of stakeholders, which was distinct from the sets of
stakeholders contesting over tax policy, net neutrality, or revenge porn. And
yet, the decisions made in separate regulatory spheres often interact in
underappreciated ways to lend the Internet its social and economic character.
Tax policy made Amazon dominant in retail, copyright policy made Google
dominant in search, and data protection law (or its absence) made Facebook
dominant in social media—with the result that all three have become
antitrust problems.
Whether or not law students should be encouraged to study “Internet law”
in a discrete course, it seems evident with the benefit of thirty years of
hindsight that the role of law in mediating cyberspace cannot be adequately
comprehended without a systemic inquiry. Mobility, I would argue, will be
much the same. While the individual components of the coming shift toward
connectivity and automation—i.e., insurance, tort liability, indemnification,
intellectual property, federal preemption, municipal traffic law, etc.—will
have analogues in known circumstances and hence will benefit from
consideration as general questions of insurance, torts, and so forth, the
interaction of the many moving parts will produce a novel, complex
ecosystem. Given the potential of that ecosystem to transform human life in
many significant ways, it is well worth investing some effort in studying
“law and mobility” as a comprehensive field.
II.

AN ILLUSTRATION FROM THREE CONNECTED TOPICS

It would be foolish to attempt a description of mobility’s future legal
architecture at this early stage in the mobility revolution. However, in an
effort to provide some further motivation for the field of “law and mobility,”
let me offer an illustration from three areas in which legal practices and
doctrines may be affected in complex ways by the shift toward connected
and automated vehicles. Although these three topics entail consideration of
separate fields of law, the technological and legal decisions made with
respect to them could well have system-wide implications, which shows the
value of keeping the entire system in perspective as discrete problems are
addressed.
A.

Policing and Public Security

For better or for worse, the advent of automated vehicles will redefine the
way that policing and law enforcement are conducted. Routine traffic stops
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are fraught, but potentially strategically significant, moments for policecitizen interactions. Half of all citizen-police interactions, 10 more than forty
percent of all drug arrests, 11 and over 30% of police shootings 12 occur in the
context of traffic stops. Much of the social tension over racial profiling and
enforcement inequality has arisen in the context of police practices with
respect to minority motorists. 13 The traffic stop is central to modern policing,
including both its successes and pathologies.
Will there continue to be routine police stops in a world of automated
vehicles? Surely traffic stops will not disappear altogether, since driverless
cars may still have broken taillights or lapsed registrations. 14 But with the
advent of cars programmed to follow the rules of the road, the number of
occasions for the police to stop cars will decline significantly. As a general
matter, the police need probable cause to stop a vehicle on a roadway. 15 A
world of predominantly automated vehicles will mean many fewer traffic
violations and hence many fewer police stops and many fewer police-citizen
interactions and arrests for evidence of crime discovered during those stops.
On the positive side, that could mean a significant reduction in some of
the abuses and racial tensions around policing. But it could also deprive the
police of a crime detection dragnet, with the consequence either that the
crime rate will increase due to the lower detection rate or that the police will
deploy new crime detection strategies that could create new problems of their
own.
Addressing these potentially sweeping changes to the practices of policing
brought about by automated vehicle technologies requires considering both
the structure of the relevant technology and the law itself. On the
technological side, connected and automated vehicles could be designed for
easy monitoring and controlling by the police. That could entail a decline in
privacy for vehicle occupants, but also potentially reduce the need for
10. Samuel Walker, Science and Politics in Police Research: Reflections on their
Tangled Relationship, 593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 137, 142 (2004);
ATTHEW R. DUROSE ET. AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN
POLICE
AND
THE
PUBLIC,
2005,
1
(2007),
available
at https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=653.
11. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 299.
12. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972).
13. Ronnie A. Dunn, Racial Profiling: A Persistent Civil Rights Challenge Even in
the Twenty-First Century, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 957, 979 (2016) (reporting statistics
on disproportionate effects on racial minorities of routine traffic stops).
14. See John Frank Weaver, Robot, Do You Know Why I Stopped You?,
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/06/why_police_might_pull
_over_self_driving_cars.html.
15. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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physical stops by the police (cars that can be remotely monitored can be
remotely ticketed) and hence some of the police-citizen roadside friction that
has dominated recent troubles.
On the legal side, the advent of connected and automated vehicles will
require rethinking the structure of Fourth Amendment law as required to
automobiles. At present, individual rights as against searches and seizures
often rely on distinctions between drivers and passengers, or owners and
occupants. For example, a passenger in a car may challenge the legality of
the police stop of a car, 16 but have diminished expectations of privacy in the
search of the vehicle’s interior if they are not the vehicle’s owners or
bailees. 17 In a mobility fleet without drivers and (as discussed momentarily)
perhaps without many individual owners, these conceptions of the
relationship of people to cars will require reconsideration.
B.

Ownership, Sharing, and the Public/Private Divide

In American culture, the individually owned automobile has historically
been far more than a transportation device—it has been an icon of freedom,
mobility, and personal identity. As Ted McAllister has written concerning
the growth of automobile culture in the early twentieth century:
The automobile squared perfectly with a distinctive American ideal of
freedom—freedom of mobility. Always a restless nation, with complex
migratory patterns throughout the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, the car came
just as a certain kind of mobility had reached an end with the closing of the
frontier. But the restlessness had not ended, and the car allowed control of
space like no other form of transportation. 18
Individual car ownership has long been central to conceptions of property
and economic status. The average American adult currently spends about ten
percent of his or her income on an automobile, 19 making it by far his or her
most expensive item of personal property. The social costs of individual
automobile ownership are far higher. 20
The automobile’s run as an icon of social status through ownership may

16. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007).
17. U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
18. Ted v. McAllister, Cars, Individualism, and the Paradox of Freedom in a Mass

Society,
https://www.frontporchrepublic.com/2011/10/cars-individualism-and-theparadox-of-freedom-in-a-mass-society/.
19. Máté Petrány, This Is How Much Americans Spend on their Cars,
https://jalopnik.com/this-is-how-much-americans-spend-on-their-cars-1596515156.
20. Edward Humes, The Absurd Primacy of the Automobile in American Life,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/04/absurd-primacy-of-the-car-inamerican-life/476346/; Robert Moor, What Happens to the American Myth When You
Take the Driver Out of It?, http://nymag.com/selectall/2016/10/is-the-self-driving-carun-american.html.
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be ending. Futurists expect that the availability of on-demand automated
vehicle service will complete the transition from mobility as personal
property to mobility as a service, as more and more households stop buying
cars and rely instead on ride sharing services. 21 Ride sharing companies like
Uber and Lyft have long been on this case, and now automobile
manufacturers are scrambling to market their vehicles as shared services. 22
With the decline of individual ownership, what will happen to conceptions
of property in the physical space of the automobile, in the contractual right
to use a particular car or fleet of automobiles, and in the data generated about
occupants and vehicles?
The coming transition from individual ownership to shared service will
also raise important questions about the line between the public and private
domains. At present, the “public sphere” is defined by mass transit whereas
the individually owned automobile constitutes the “private sphere.” The
public sphere operates according to ancient common carrier rules of
universal access and non-discrimination, whereas a car is not quite “a man’s
castle on wheels” for constitutional purposes, 23 but still a non-public space
dominated by individual rights as against the state rather than public
obligations. 24 As more and more vehicles are held and used in shared fleets
rather than individual hands, the traditional line between publicly minded
“mass transit” and individually minded vehicle ownership will come under
pressure, with significant consequences for both efficiency and equality.
C.

Platform Mobility, Competition, and Regulation

The coming transition toward ride sharing fleets rather than individual
vehicle ownership described in the previous section will have additional
important implications for the economic structure of mobility—which of
course will raise important regulatory questions as well. At present, the
private transportation system is highly atomistic. In the United States alone,
there are 264 million individually owned motor vehicles in operation. 25 For

21. Smart
Cities
and
the
Vehicle
Ownership
Shift,
https://www.automotiveworld.com/analysis/smart-cities-vehicle-ownership-shift/.
22. Ryan Felton, GM Aims to Get Ahead of Everyone with Autonomous Ride-Sharing
Service in Multiple Cities by 2019, https://jalopnik.com/gm-aims-to-get-ahead-ofeveryone-with-autonomous-ride-s-1820886131.
23. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (“The Fourth Amendment does
not treat a motorist’s car as his castle.”).
24. E.g., Byrne v. Rutledge, 623 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding the motor vehicle
license plates were nonpublic fora and that state’s ban on vanity plates referencing
religious topic violated First Amendment).
25. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Transportation Energy Data Book, Chapter 8, Household
Vehicles and Characteristics, Table 8.1, Population and Vehicle Profile,
https://cta.ornl.gov/data/chapter8.shtml (last visited May 29, 2018).
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the reasons previously identified, expect many of these vehicles to shift
toward corporate-owned fleets in coming years. The question then will be
how many such fleets will operate—whether we will see robust fleet-to-fleet
competition or instead the convergence toward a few dominant providers as
we are seeing in other important areas of the “platform economy.”
There is every reason to believe that, before too long, mobility will tend
in the direction of other monopoly or oligopoly platforms because it will
share their economic structure. The key economic facts behind the rise of
dominant platforms like Amazon, Twitter, Google, Facebook, Microsoft,
and Apple are the presence of scale economies and network effects—system
attributes that make the system more desirable for others users as new users
join. 26 In the case of the mobility revolution, a number of features are
suggestive of future scale economies and network effects. The more cars in
a fleet, the more likely it is that one will be available when summoned by a
user. 27 The more cars connected to other cars in a fleet, the higher the quality
of the information (on such topics as road and weather conditions and vehicle
performance) available within the fleet and the steeper the machine learning
curve.
As is true with other platforms, the mere presence of scale economic and
network effects does not have to lead inexorably to market concentration or
monopoly. Law and regulation may intervene to mitigate these effects, for
example by requiring information sharing or interconnection among rival
platforms. But such mandatory information sharing or interconnection
obligations are not always advisable, as they can diminish a platform’s
incentives to invest in its own infrastructure or otherwise impair incentives
to compete.
Circling back to the “law of the horse” point raised at the outset, these
issues are not, of course, unique to law and mobility. But this brief
examination of these three topics—policing, ownership, and competition—
shows the value of considering law and mobility as a distinct topic.
Technological, legal, and regulatory decisions we make with respect to one
particular set of problems will have implications for distinct problems
perhaps not under consideration at that moment. For example, law and
technology will operate conjunctively to define the bounds of privacy
expectations in connected and automated vehicles, with implications for
search and seizure law, property and data privacy norms, and sharing

26. See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, A Guide to the Antitrust
Economics of Networks, Antitrust, Spring 1996, at 36; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. Econ. Persp. 93 (1994).
27. This should hold even though a larger fleet would also mean more subscribers,
since the average distance between a user and an available vehicle should decline with
an increase in the fleet’s market penetration.
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obligations to promote competition. Pulling a “privacy lever” in one
context—say to safeguard against excessive police searches—could have
spillover effects in another context, for example by bolstering a dominant
mobility platform’s arguments against mandatory data sharing. Although
the interactions between the different technological decisions and related
legal norms are surely impossible to predict or manage with exactitude,
consideration of law and mobility as a system will permit a holistic view of
this complex, evolving ecosystem.
CONCLUSION
Law and regulation will be at the center of the coming mobility revolution.
Many of the patterns we will observe at the intersection of law and the new
technologies will be familiar—at least if we spend the time to study past
technological revolutions—and general principles will be sufficient to
answer many of the rising questions. At the same time, there is a benefit to
considering the field of law and mobility comprehensively with an eye to
understanding the often subtle interactions between discrete technological
and legal decisions. The Journal of Law and Mobility aims to play an
important role in this fast-moving space.

